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This paper investigates whether the range of activities conducted by banks influences their performance 
and risk. Using an unbalanced panel dataset which includes 308 bank-year observations, for the period 
2006-2011, corresponding to 52 Italian Bank Holding Companies in the last year, the core question is to 
analyse the effect of diversification across and within both traditional and non-traditional income and if the 
results have been affected by the financial crisis. The main results suggest that revenue diversification plays 
a role in determining bank performance. The relative effects appear, however, to be different in relation to 
banks’ size and capital ratio. The results have strategic implications both for bank managers, regulators and 
supervisors for the consequences on banks’ performance and stability. 
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The paper addresses the question of diversification in the banking sector. The transformation of European 
banking systems in the last three decades has been intense and strictly related to the effects of 
deregulation and innovation on the competitive environment. The deregulation process has largely been 
based on the view that income diversification reduces the volatility of bank earnings and makes banks more 
resilient to financial distress. After the financial crisis, the argument gains ground that the banking industry 
should be less diversified and refocused on lending activities (Vallascas et al., 2012). 
Theoretically, the literature on bank diversification primary rests on the assumption that diversification 
may lead to cost savings or revenue improvements due to spreading of fixed costs, economies of scope 
from using the same information, customer cost economies (Berger et al, 1987). Second banks may also 
reduce their risks by engaging in a wide range of activities exploiting the diversification benefit (Diamond, 
1984) and by reducing the agency costs of managerial discretion by lowering cash-flow volatility (Stulz, 
1990; Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
As in previous studies, rather than attempting to measure economies of scope and agency problems 
directly, we investigate whether the range of activities conducted by banks influences their performance 
and risk. This is particularly interesting given the turmoil period investigated; in fact, this argument gains 
ground given the on-going debates as to what the scope of bank activities should be. 
The research questions are addressed to evaluate the relationship between diversification and 
performance taking into account also the diversification effects between different business lines. This 
represents one of the novelties of the paper; in fact, with respect to the previous work on bank 
diversification, our paper represents the first attempt to directly assess the risk/return implications of 
different types of product mixes through the splitting of non-traditional revenues into different 
components. Furthermore, in our study we analyse whether certain type of institutions are better able to 
reap the benefits of diversification analysing performance implications for different categories of banks. In 
this respect our analysis deserves interesting new issues taking into account the interactive effect between 
non-traditional bank activities, bank size and its capitalization degree. Moreover, we use data at the bank 
individual level using consolidated balanche sheet when available and unconsolidated if not; this choice is 
of particular importance for several reasons the principal one linked to the fact that banks tend to reserve 
the making of non traditional innovative activities to non-banking subsidiaries whose contribution can be 
more precisely evaluate if consolidated financial statements are available. 
The main results suggest that revenue diversification plays a role in determining bank performance. The 
relative effects appear, however, to be different in relation to banks’ size and capital ratio. 
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we perform several robustness checks, considering measurement 
issues and controlling for potential endogeneity and selectivity problems between bank performance and 
diversification. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the nexus 
between both type of diversification and bank performance. Section 3 presents the econometric 
methodology and the data used. Section 4 describes the results and discusses the robustness. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
Theoretically, the literature on bank diversification analyses the benefit and costs associated to the strategy 
developed. Among the former are the results of the portfolio theory that postulate that as long as the 
revenue streams from different financial activities are less than perfectly correlated, income diversification 
should offer banks opportunities to grow their risk-adjusted profits. Thanks to economies of scope, 
diversification may lead to an increase in performance through cost savings or revenue improvements due 
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to the joint production of a wide range of financial services (Teece, 1980 and 1982; Llewellyn, 1996; Klein 
and Saidenberg, 1997); moreover, diversified banks should realize revenue efficiencies when cross-selling 
various (fee-based) financial products alongside traditional lending-based services (Herring e Santomero, 
1990). Given information asymmetry, banks gain valuable information on their clients by providing a service 
that might grant advantages in the provision of other services (Diamond, 1984; Rajan, 1992; Saunders and 
Walter, 1994; Stein, 2002). Finally, for some agency theories diversification reduces the agency costs of 
managerial discretion by lowering cash-flow volatility (Stulz, 1990; Amihud and Lev, 1981) or by creating 
internal capital markets (Stein, 1997; Gertner et al. 1994).  
Alongside the positive effects, adverse implications on performance have been identified. Diversification 
can intensify agency problems between corporate insiders and small shareholders making it more difficult 
to design efficient managerial incentive contracts and more difficult to align the incentives of outsiders with 
insiders (Aron, 1988; Stulz, 1990; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994). Increasing the size and scope of a bank’s 
activities introduces the “cost of complexity”, which at some point may dominate the benefits that can be 
achieved (Rajan et al, 2000); diversified banks can use their advantage to operate with greater leverage, 
since several fee-based activities can be performed holding little or no regulatory capital, and to pursue 
riskier lending (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; DeYoung and Roland, 2001). Diversified institutions can be 
characterized by volatile earnings (i.e.: investment banking activities), lower switching costs for clients (i.e.: 
non-traditional banking services are based on transaction-based bank-client relationships) and higher 
operational leverage (given the heavy fixed investments in technology and human resources required) 
increasing in this way volatility of earnings and hampering risk adjusted performance measures.  
Despite extensive research on the economic consequences of diversification, the empirical literature does 
not provide clear evidence on whether diversification generates net benefits or costs; this could be linked 
to the fact that it is extraordinarily difficult to unequivocally measure economies of scope or agency 
problems empirically. Given this, a more recent strand of empirical literature rather than attempting to 
measure economies of scope and agency problems directly, investigate whether the range of activities 
conducted by financial institutions influences their performance.  
The empirical analysis centred on the profile of the diversification between interest and non-interest 
bearing activities has largely concerned the US banking system following the implementation in 1999 of 
Gramm Leach Bliely Act (also known as Financial Services Modernisation Act) that abolished part of the 




 the results conclude that the costs of diversification outweigh the benefits (Stiroh, 
2004a,b; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Goddard et al. (2008)) and the result is valid 
both for financial holding companies and smaller institutions such as credit unions. 
Fewer studies deal with European banks. Among them, Mercieca et al. (2007) explores the economic 
impact of diversification on average profitability by calculating the effect of an increase in the non-interest 
share on a sample of 755 small European banks for the period 1997–2003. The analysis evidences that an 
increase in non-interest activities has two main effects, that are a direct impact from shifting into non-
interest activities and, an indirect effect arising from changes in diversification. Moreover, a negative net 
effects for average profitability and a corresponding positive effects on volatility are detected. The results 
are robust with respect to several controls, suggesting that over the investigated period the higher volatility 
of net-interest income outweighs diversification benefits. Lepetit et al. (2008) focusing on the relationship 
between bank risk and product diversification for a set of European banks belonging to 14 countries during 
the period 1996-2012 find that a shift into non-interest activities involves higher risk and this is particular 
true for smaller banks and driven by commission and fee activities.  
Turning to the Italian situations, Acharya et al. (2006) analyse the relationship between industrial loan 
diversification and performance using data from 105 Italian banks over the period 1993-1999 concluding 
that diversification of bank assets is not guaranteed to produce superior performance and/or greater safety 
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for banks. Chiorazzo et al. (2008) using annual data from 85 Italian banks over the period 1993–2003 find 
that income diversification increases risk-adjusted returns and that diversification gains diminish with bank 
size. Cotugno and Stefanelli (2012) using a panel dataset comprising 4038 observations relative to Italian 
banks for the period 2005-2010 find a positive relationship between product diversification and bank 
performance also in terms of risk adjusted measures. Vallascas et al. (2012) on a sample of 145 Italian 
banks during the period 2006-2008, verifies that diversification benefits depend on the type of activities 
developed. They verify that banks that were diversified within narrow activity classes before the crisis 
experienced large declines in performance during the financial crisis. By contrast, diversification across 
broad activity classes, such as lending and capital market activities, did not cause performance losses 
during the crisis.  
Following the above literature in the paper, we consider the effects of revenue diversification on 
performance. The aim is to investigate whether, and to what extent, bank propensity toward non-interest 
income affects some principal risk adjusted performance measures. In particular, the principal hypotheses 
to be tested in the remainder of the paper are the following: 
H1 – the existence of a positive relationship between performance and diversification between traditional 
and non-traditional revenue bearing activities; 
H2 – the evidence of a positive relationship between performance and diversification between traditional 
and the individual components of non-traditional revenue bearing activities; 
H3 - verify if larger or more capitalized institutions are better able to reap the benefits of diversification 
strategies in terms of increased performance. 
With respect to the previous work on bank diversification, our paper represents the first attempt to directly 
assess the risk/return implications of different types of product mixes. Non traditional revenues are in fact 
split into different components. Second a large amount of additional explanatory variables have been 
included in the model in order to avoid potential omitted variables bias. Finally, we consider a large set of 
diversification and risk adjusted performance measures at the bank individual level using consolidated 
balanche sheet when available and unconsolidated if not. This latter choice is of particular importance for 
at least three reasons: first, banks tend to reserve the making of non traditional innovative activities to non-
banking subsidiaries whose contribution can be more precisely evaluate if consolidated financial 
statements are available; then, diversification benefits may exist for the institution as a whole and not for 
the single subsidiary; finally, from a regulatory point of view it is imporant to evaluate the single bank 
holding company because it is the relevant unit to take into account in case of systemic risk (Stiroh and 
Rumble, 2006).  
 
 
3. Variables definition and methodology 
 
3.1. Measure of banks’ revenue diversification  
To determine the degree of bank diversification asset-based measure and/or income-based indicator can 
be used. Ideally to measure the diversification of bank activities, detailed data on the degree to which each 
bank underwrites, operates mutual funds, insurance, etc. should be used. The dataset available do not 
provide this kind of information, so, several authors, construct revenue based measure. Traditionally in 
literature (Stiroh, 2004a,b; Lepetit et al., 2008) one way to capture the degree of diversification of bank 
activities is to consider the net interest income generated by traditional activities and non-interest income 
produced by non-traditional ones. These revenue based measures suffer from larger measurement 
problems than the asset-based measure (Laeven and Levine 2007). In fact, loans and in general more 
traditional activities can yield fee income; in this way the income-based measure could overestimate the 
degree to which some lending institutions engage in non-lending activities. For instance, DeYoung and Rice 
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(2004) show that payment services linked to the traditional banking activities are the largest source of non-
interest income for U.S. banks. 
To mitigate the overestimation problem, we disaggregate fee income in relation to the type of activity 
developed. In particular, as in Vallascas et al. (2012), we divide gross commission revenue along four 
principal dimensions; the first three identify a productive diversification profile while the last one a 
distributive diversification strategy followed by the banks in the sample. The four categories are Traditional 
Banking Commission (TBC) that comprises commission income from guarantees given, collection and 
payment services, services related to factoring, tax collection services, current accounts management and 
other services; Market and Trading Commission (MKT) fee and commission revenue from credit derivatives, 
trading operations in financial instruments and foreign exchange, custody and administration of securities, 
underwriting operations, servicing related to securitization, placement of securities, multilateral trading 
facilities management, financial structure consultancy service; Asset management commission (AM) from 
portfolio management services, depositary bank services and investment consultancy service; Fee based 
revenues from the distribution of third party products and services (DIS). 
In line with our research questions, we construct a measure of diversification across different sources of 
income. To this end, following Lepetit et al. (2008) we define several variables.  
First, we consider the ratio of non traditional income on total operating revenues (NON_TOP). NON is the 
difference between total operating revenues and traditional income (TRADT). TRADT is the sum of gross 
interest revenue
3
 and Traditional Banking Commission (TBC).  
Second, we disaggregate our diversification measures to allow for deeper insights. We distinguish four 
components of non traditional income. The first one is MKT_TOP which is the sum of gross market and 
trading Commission (MKT_TOP) on total operating revenue, the second one is the share of asset 
management commission (AM_TOP), the third one is the fraction of fee based revenues from the 
distribution of third party products and services (DIS_TOP) and the last one is the ratio between the 
absolute values of net result from financial operations
4
 and total operating revenue (OPFIN_TOP). Finally, 
TOP – total operating revenue - is the sum of the five components (TOP = TRADT+ MKT + AM + DIS + 
OPFIN).  
These shares show how focused a bank holding company is on a particular non traditional activity. 
Moreover, following DeYoung and Roland (2001), Elsas et al. (2010) and Vallascas et al.(2012) that argue 
that the use of gross revenues is preferable to net revenues because allocating expenses (especially interest 
expenses) to different lines of bank business is somewhat arbitrary and may lead to biased diversity 
measures, we use gross measures.  
 
3.2. Risk adjusted performance measures  
Two alternative proxies of bank performance are employed: the return on assets (ROA) defined as the ratio 
of net results from ordinary activity to total assets. To adjust this measure for risk (volatility), following 
Stiroh (2004a,b) and Chiorazzo et al. (2008) we compute the ratio between the annual return on asset and 






SHROA =  
where SHROAi,t indicates ROA risk-adjusted returns, for the bank i in the year t. 
                                               
3
 Gross interest revenues are computes as Interest and similar income - Interest and similar income on Financial assets held for 
trading - Interest and similar income on Hedging derivatives. 
4 OPFIN comprises net result from trading and hedging activities, plus profits from sale of activities and repurchase of liabilities and 
net results from financial assets and liabilities designated at fair value. 
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Finally as in Stiroh 2004a,b we introduce a measure of insolvency risk computed in terms of the Z-score. 




























3.3. Control variables 
The banking sector all around the world has experienced major transformations in its environment, 
resulting in significant impacts on its performance. Thereby, both external and internal factors have been 
affecting the profitability of banks over time. The internal determinants include bank-specific variables. The 
external variables reflect environmental variables that are expected to affect the profitability of financial 
institutions. This section describes the control variables that we use in the econometric model distinguish 
between bank specific and external determinants. 
 
Bank specific determinants 
To capture the effects of bank size we use the continuous variable SIZE which is equal to the ln (Total asset) 
– SIZE; to control for the potential nonlinear relationship between size and performance, as in Berger et al. 
(2010), we also include the squared term of ln (Total asset) – SIZE_SQ.  
As a proxy for bank capital we use the equity to total asset ratio (E_TA).  
To evaluate if the lending strategy affects risk-adjusted returns we use the variable LOAN, which is the ratio 
between total loans and bank assets (DeYoung and Rice, 2004a; Stiroh, 2004a, Chiorazzo et al., 2008). The 
sign of the relation between lending strategy and risk-adjusted return is positive if loans are more 
profitable than other earning assets. 
To proxy bank’s credit quality we use the ratio Non-performing loans over Total loans (NPL) and the ratio of 
loan loss provisions over total loans (LLP).The two indexes are a good proxy for a measure of ex-post and 
ex-ante credit risk. 
To proxy for managers risk attitude, we insert the variable GROWTH computed as the growth rate of bank 
total asset. Risk-loving bank managers usually prefer fast growth to more stable profits (Stiroh, 2004a). 
GROWTH could be also interpreted as a control variable for growth-by-acquisition (Chiorazzo et al., 2008).  
To measure the effect of efficiency on bank profitability we introduce in the analysis the cost income ratio 
(COST_INCOME) computed as the ratio between personnel expenses and other administrative expenses 
over intermediation margin.  
To assess bank's liquidity we employ the ratio Loans over the sum of Deposits and bond [LTDB] computed 
dividing the banks total loans by its total deposits and bonds issued. If the ratio is too high, it means that 
banks might not have enough liquidity to cover any unforeseen fund requirements; if the ratio is too low, 
banks may not be earning as much as they could be. There are also some empirical studies indicating that 
more reliance on market funding corresponds to higher risk exposure on the asset side of the balance sheet 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010 and Norden and Weber, 2010). 
 
External determinants 
In addition to the bank-specific variables described above, our analysis includes a set of macroeconomic 
and industry-specific characteristics.  
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As the demand for lending increases during cyclical upswings, we introduce a measure of the Real GDP 
growth rate. The GDP_INDEX measures the GDP growth rate calculated in respect to the i-bank, weighting 
the indicator at the province level with the ratio of branches in the province in respect to the total amount 
of branches of the i-bank. The procedure allows to take into account of the different impact that each 













where i refers to the bank and zp to the province where the bank operates. 
Finally, to catch the effect of the financial crisis a structural break dummy is introduced. To account for the 
consequences from financial crisis we insert a dummy variable equals to zero for the years 2006, 2007 and 
2008 and equals to one otherwise. 
 
3.4. Empirical methodology 
We use the two econometric models shown to examine the link between diversification and the level and 
volatility of the banks’ profitability. In particular, the first one is useful to test for H1, while the second for 




ti,sti,1ti,ti, ελβNON_TOPβαy +++= ∑
=




ti,sti,4ti,3ti,2ti,1ti,ti, ελβOPFIN_TOPβDIS_TOPβAM_TOPβMKT_TOPβαy ++++++= ∑
=
 (2) 
where i identifies the individual bank-observation belonging to the sample (i = 1, 2, 3,...,308); t expresses 
the time variable (t = 2006,…, 2011); βs are the parameters to be estimated, λ is a matrix of control 
variables. Both the constant and the error terms are also indicated in the model. 
NON_TOP is the proportion of non traditional revenues (MKT, AM, DIS and OPFIN) over the total operating 
revenues, MKT_TOP is the proportion of market and trading commission, AM_TOP is the proportion of 
asset management commission, DIS_TOP is the proportion of thrid party products and services distributive 
commission and finally OPFIN_TOP is the proportion of net result of financial operations, all variables 
computed as the propotion over the total operating revenues.  
In the first model, β1 denotes the effect on performance due to variations in the share of non traditional 
income share. In the second model, β1- β4 denotes the effect on performance due to variations in the 
share of the different types of non traditional revenues types -commision income and net results from 
financial operations. Positive values of β1- β4 show that increases in non traditional income share are 
associated with higher returns. 
It is important to note that the regression coefficients on the individual component shares in the revenue 
shares measure the effect of a shift from the omitted category of the component share into an alternative 
since one component share has to be excluded to avoid perfect collinearity. Since the shares sum to one; 
the coefficient on the included shares shows the impact of a 0.01 change from the omitted share to the 
included ones. In our exercise, we omit the varbiale traditional revenues (TRADT); thus the coefficcients β1- 
β4 denotes the impact of a 0.01 change in the traditional revenues stream towards the non traditional 
revenue generating activities.  
The other variables control for factors potentially affecting the level and volatility of profits.  
To test for the third hypothesis - in the empirical analysis, both in equations 1 and 2, we use the product 
between the measures of diversification and size in order to evaluate the interaction between size and 
diversification strategies and the product with capital ratio in order to evaluate the interaction with the 
degree of capitalisation. 
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A list of the variable used is presented in Table 2. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
 
4. Data and empirical results 
 
4.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
Bank-level data come from ABI Banking Data Set, which contains detailed financial information on Italian 
banks. We exclude banks with missing data on basic accounting variables, including assets, loans, deposits, 
equity, interest income, non-interest income and commission. Finally, we exclude extreme outliers, which 
we define as banks with all performance measures outside the first and 99th percentile. The analysis covers 
the period 2006-2011. The starting date is 2006 since for all the Italian banks accounting data based on IAS-
IFRS start from that date. The final dataset includes 308 bank-year observations corresponding to 52 BHC in 
the last year. 
Differently from DeYoung and Roland (2001), Chiorazzo et al. (2008) and Vallascas et al. (2012) we analyze 
the relationship between diversification strategies and bank performance using consolidated accounting 
data when available and unconsolidated otherwise. 
In the analysis data on macro environmental variables, over the period 2006-2011, are also used. 
Information on GDP at the provincial level are provided by ISTAT and by Istituto Tagliacarne. 
The coverage of our sample relative to the population of the whole Italian banking system is nearly 70 per 
cent in terms of number of banks while above 95 per cent in terms of total asset, and it is quite stable over 
the analysed period (Table 2). 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample of Italian BHC. These BHC are quite varied with 
mean average asset of 49.9 billion and a range from 0.072 billion to 1,050 billion. As with the Italian 
banking system as a whole, this sample is dominated by a few large banks so the mean greatly exceed the 
median (49.9 vs. 7.1). On the performance side our sample includes both low and high performing BHCs. 
The mean ROA is 0.007, with a median of 0.007 and a range from -0.044 to +0.058. This variation is useful 
to identify the link between operating strategies and performance.  
The differences in operating strategies can be infered from the revenue diversification measures. The 
average (mean) bank generated 77.5% of its revenues from traditional activities. Turning to the non-
interest income revenues the majority is represented by results from financial operation (OPFIN) that 
contributes for nearly 30% to the formation of the non-interest income, followed by Asset Management 
(AM) fee and commission (nearly 28%), market (MKT) commission (24%) and finally distribution 
commissions (DIS) (18%). 
Fee and commision more linked to traditional banking business (TBC) represents the 54.6% of total fee and 
commisisons aggregate; this result to testifies their relevance (Table 4). Therefore, if traditional banking 
commissions are added to gross interest income, they represent the 15.2% of the traditional income 
aggregate. 
 






4.2. Multivariate Analysis  
As for the first research question, H1 – the existence of a positive relationship between performance and 
diversification between traditional and non-traditional revenue bearing activities, the aim is to understand 
how and in which measure the non-traditional activities have contributed to the profitable strategies of the 
bank in terms of performance and risk (Table 5). 
The main result is that the non-traditional revenue component (NON_TOP) impacts positively both on the 
profitability and on the risk-adjusted profitability. No statistical significative effect is evident with respect to 
the risk. This result is further investigated taking into account both the interactive effect with bank size and 
capitalization.  
As for size, we find that if the bank increases its non-traditional revenue component as well as its size the 
profitability decreases but at the same time the risk-adjusted profitability increases because the risk 
decreases. A larger bank can invest more in the non-traditional segment because can account for a more 
strategic experience on these activities; in other words, the result could be connected to the fact that larger 
banks are better equipped to manage risk linked to non-interest income activities than smallest ones. 
Finally controlling for the interactive effect with the capital ratio, we find that as the non-traditional 
activities as well as the capital ratio increase then both the profitability and the risk increase. Following the 
classical economic theory on bank capitalisation suggesting an inverse effect of capitalization on bank 
distress (e.g., Lehar, 2005; Posghosyan and Cihak, 2011) our results appear at least contradictory. Despite 
this, Porter and Chiou (2012) report empirical results that – coherently with ours – support the theory that 
banks respond to more capital by increasing the risk in their earning asset portfolios and off-balance-sheet 
activities. 
As for the control variables results are coherent with the expected signs. The negative and statistical 
significant sign for the dummy break variable suggests that financial crisis, as expected, negatively impact 
bank performance and risk.  
 
[Table 5   around here] 
 
Turning to the second hypothesis to be tested, H2 – the evidence of a positive relationship between 
performance and diversification between traditional and the individual components of non-traditional 
revenue bearing activities, similarly to the previous analysis further controls have been proposed to better 
understand the interactive effects of the single non-traditional revenue with both the size and the capital 
ratio.  
Starting from the basic models (Table 6, columns 1-4-7) we investigate the effects of the individual non-
traditional component share on bank risk and profitability. Evidence suggests that asset management, 
distribution and results from financial operation components positively affect the bank return-on-asset 
(ROA). As for risk adjusted profitability (SHROA) also market component plays a positive and statistically 
significant role influencing the bank profitability dimension. 
As for ROA, the introduction of the interactive effect with the size (Table 6, columns 2-5-8) doesn’t 
substantially affect the previous results; however, when market, distribution and financial operation 
components increase as well as the size increase the profitability decreases suggesting the presence some 
diseconomies of scale. For the asset management component different result are detected. In terms of 
SHROA, the direct effect is negative however if the asset management component increases as well as the 
size the sign is simply reversed. Larger banks seem to better equipped to manage the asset management 
component. As for default risk, the single non-traditional components imply an increased risk; however if 
the market, asset management and distribution components increase as well as the size increase the risk 
appears to diminish. Once again this result suggests that larger banks are better organized to manage the 
risk associated to this type of activities. 
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Finally as for the interactive effect with the capital ratio (Table 6, columns 3-6-9) results appear particularly 
of interest when evaluated in relation to the probability of default. In this case, the single non-traditional 
components (MKT_TOP, AM_TOP and OPFIN_TOP) implies a decreasing risk for the bank. However if these 
activities increase as well as the capital ratio the result is reversed. Increasing the market, asset 
management, distribution and the results from financial operation components is riskier for banks more 
capitalized. Also this result is in line with the Porter and Chiou (2012) thesis suggesting more capital 
accompanied by increased investments in market activities may imply more bank risk. On the same point 
Berger et al. (2008) suggest banks with high earning volatility would likely hold more capital. In a nutshell, 
banks more volatile and more sensitive to risk would minimize their costs of financial distress by 
maintaining high capital ratios. On the other side it is important to consider also the effect of the bank size 
and the attitude towards diversification given that larger banks enjoy scale economies in risk management, 
have easier access to capital markets and the “too big to fail” option could exacerbate their risk attitude. In 
this respect our analysis deserves interesting new issues taking into account the interactive effect between 
non-traditional bank activities, bank size and its capitalization degree suggesting: i) larger bank size implies 
less risk in line with the economies of scale argument while increasing the non-traditional activity 
components implies more risk; however increasing the non-traditional components for large banks implies 
less risk, i.e. larger banks are better equipped to manage risk earning components. ii) as capital ratio 
increases the bank risk decrease in line with the mainstream regulation literature (see among others e.g., 
Lehar, 2005; Posghosyan and Cihak, 2011). Then, differently from the previous model the single non-
traditional components decrease bank risk but if the bank exacerbate its non-traditional activity increasing 
also its capital ratio it suggests an increasing risk attitude. 
As for the control variables results are in line with the expected signs. Also this further investigation 
confirms the negative impact of the financial turmoil in terms of risk and profitability.  
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
 
4.3. Robustness check 
In this section we investigate the likely impact of: - different measures of bank performance; - the 
endogeneity issue. In our opinion these are the principal reasons for the discrepancy among the results of 
the different studies reviewed and our contribution. 
For a further investigation of the relationship between diversification and performance, first of all we 
introduce alternative measures of bank performance. Two are the alternative measures employed: the 
return on equity (ROE) which is the ratio of net profits to equity, and the risk adjusted return on equity 
(SHROE) computed as the ratio between annual return on equity , and its standard deviation calculated 
over the entire sample period. As can be seen in Table 6 our major empirical findings remain qualitatively 
unchanged: considering both a macro-diversification index or a more disaggregated non-traditional income 
components measure implies a positive effect on ROE also on a risk adjusted basis. 
Our second robustness check is linked to the fat that our results, and indeed many previous studies, are 
subject to an endogeneity problem. Specifically, a finding that diversified banks are more profitable than 
non-diversified banks is not evidence per se that diversification fosters profitability. It could reflect a 
tendency for diversified banks to overperform their non-diversified counterparts prior to the diversification 
decision. If then the endogeneity of the diversification variable is controlled for, it is likely that any 
previously observed relationship between diversification and performance disappears.  
Following Laeven and Levine (2007) and Elsas et al. (2010), we control for selectivity, i.e. the problem that 
the same characteristics which affect the decision to diversify affect a bank’s performance. To this end, we 
estimate a Heckman (1979) treatment effects model by maximum likelihood. The model consists of one 
equation for the determinants of the performance measure, where a dummy variable indicates whether a 
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firm is diversified or not. The dummy equals one, if the ratio of non traditional income over total operating 
income exceeds 22.61%, i.e. the 75% quantile of the empirical distribution. The model comprises a 
simultaneous probit estimation, where the dummy for a diversified bank is explained by variables 
exogenous to performance measures. In our baseline specification (see Table 5), performance measures 
seem not to depend on the total asset growth and on the GDP index. However, it is obvious that total asset 
and local GDP growth represent two important strategic instruments for banks in order to manage their 
corporate portfolio and in this way the scope of the diversification strategy, in this sense we use the two 
variables as exogenous instruments. 
Table 7 shows the results of these selectivity estimations. In column 1, we present estimation results based 
on ROA, in column 2 based on SHROA and finally in column 3 based on Z-Score. The coefficient estimates 
support our main results – diversification positively affects performance. Hence, our results are robust to 
selectivity as well. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper empirically investigates the effects that revenue diversification strategies play on bank 
performance for a sample of Italian BHCs during the 2006-2011 period.  
The main results can be summarized as follow. 
First of all, the diversification analysis suggests that considering both a macro-diversification index or a 
more disaggregated non-traditional income components measure implies a positive effect on performance 
also on a risk adjusted basis while no statistical effect is verified in terms of risk.  
Then, the introduction of the first interactive term that captures bank performance in terms of the degree 
of diversification in relation to asset size, evidence suggests that if a bank increase diversification towards 
non traditional income increasing as well as its size the impact in terms of risk-adjusted profitability is 
positive. The result could be connected to the fact that larger banks are better equipped to manage risk 
linked to non-interest income activities. 
As for the second inetractive term, the one that relates bank performance, diversification and degree of 
capitalisation, the main empirical results suggest that increasing the non-traditional components is riskier 
for banks more capitalized since more capital can be accompanied by increased investments in market 
activities may generate more bank vulnerability.  
Our analysis takes also into account the financial crisis effect. Results, as expected, suggest that financial 
turmoil negatively impact bank performance and risk. 
To conclude, our analysis deserves interesting new issues taking into account the interactive effect 
between non-traditional bank activities, bank size and its capitalization degree suggesting that larger banks 
are better equipped to manage risk earning components and that more diversified and capitalized bank are 
characterised by higher risk attitude.  
These results imply important policy implications suggesting that the usual capitalisation rules adopted by 
regulators and addressed to increase bank capitalisation for stability reasons can be misleading suggesting 
the development of new alternative tools. 
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Table 1  Variables names and definitions  
Name Definition 
ROA Net results from ordinary activity over total asset 





























Ratio of traditional income (Gross interest + Traditional Banking Commission) on total 
operating revenues  
NON_TOP Ratio of non traditional income on total operating revenues 
MKT_TOP Market and trading Commission on total operating revenue  
AM_TOP Share of asset management commission on total operating revenue  
DIS_TOP 
Ratio of fee based revenues from the distribution of third party products and services on 
total operating revenue  
OPFIN_TOP Net result from financial operations over total operating revenue  
SIZE Ln Total Asset 
SIZE_SQ (Ln Total Asset)^2 
COST_INCO
ME 
Personnel and other administrative expenses over intermediation margin 
E_TA Equity over Total Asset 
LOAN Total loans over total asset 
GROWTH Yearly growth rate in total asset 
LTDB Total loans over total deposits and bonds 
NPL Net non performing loans over net loans 




















Table 2  Sample coverage 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Number 
BHC: sample 48 50 52 55 51 52 
BHC: national total 87 82 81 75 76 77 
Italian banks: national total^ 579 585 576 565 552 551 
BHC: sample coverage [%] 55.2 61.0 64.2 73.3 67.1 67.5 
       
 Total assets (in bilions) 
BHC: sample 1,783  2,466  2,785  2,715  2,806  2,817  
BHC: national total  n.d.  2,772  2,875  2,791  2,846  2,882  
BHC: sample coverage n.d. 89.0  96.9  97.3  98.6  97.8  
 
^ The total is given by the sum of the following categories: BHC + Independent bank + Mutual banks 
This table reports the number of banks and total asset for the BHCs group, both in the sample and in the population, and the whole 
Italian banking system for each calendar year. Sample coverage of the BHCs group is provided. Source: Bank of Italy – Annual 





Table 3  Summary statistics for all bank holding companies, on average over the period 2006-2011  
 
 
Obs mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd 
         
Performance Measure 
ROA 308 0.007 -0.044 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.058 0.009 
SHROA 306 1.558 -2.368 0.686 1.440 2.489 6.106 1.423 
Z-SCORE 308 21.228 1.642 12.792 18.743 29.116 62.756 11.523 
         
Revenue diversification 
TRAD_TOP 308 0.775 0.108 0.774 0.859 0.903 1.000 0.222 
NON_TOP 308 0.225 0.000 0.097 0.141 0.226 0.892 0.222 
MKT_TOP 308 0.054 0.000 0.018 0.029 0.049 0.558 0.080 
AM_TOP 308 0.062 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.045 0.758 0.133 
DIS_TOP 308 0.043 0.000 0.006 0.016 0.036 0.813 0.104 
OPFIN_TOP 308 0.066 0.000 0.024 0.048 0.085 0.455 0.067 
         
Control variables 
Total Assets 
[000] 308 49,906,828 72,968  3,011,750  7,139,615  26,200,000  1,045,611,549 153,666,188 
SIZE 308 15.932 11.198 14.918 15.781 17.082 20.768 1.801 
SIZE_SQ 308 257.067 125.390 222.547 249.041 291.791 431.304 58.432 
COST_INCOME 308 0.682 0.193 0.584 0.654 0.729 2.616 0.227 
E_TA 308 0.127 0.000 0.098 0.110 0.129 1.421 0.090 
LOAN 308 0.664 0.039 0.604 0.727 0.798 0.990 0.213 
GROWTH 308 0.070 -0.260 0.000 0.037 0.116 0.963 0.142 
LTDB 308 0.928 0.333 0.879 0.946 1.004 3.008 0.192 
NPL 308 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.011 0.017 0.098 0.012 
LLP 308 -0.007 -0.039 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 0.002 0.006 
GDP_INDEX 308 0.070 -0.931 -0.110 -0.004 0.046 9.172 0.837 




Table 4  Non-traditional income components: descriptive statistics average 2006-2011 
 MKT_NON AM_NON DIS_NON OPFIN_NON TBC_COM TBC_TRADT 
Obs 308 308 308 308 308 308 
mean 25.1% 16.7% 18.6% 39.3% 54.6% 15.2% 
min 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 
p25 12.7% 0.6% 5.5% 19.2% 43.4% 8.4% 
p50 24.4% 10.6% 11.6% 37.5% 59.9% 13.7% 
p75 35.7% 25.5% 23.0% 53.5% 72.3% 18.7% 
max 97.1% 89.1% 96.8% 100.0% 100.0% 88.6% 
sd 0.178 0.187 0.211 0.262 0.261 0.113 
NON: Total non traditional income (MKT + AM + DIS + OPFIN) 
COM: Total fees and commissions (TBC + MKT + AM + DIS) 
TRADT: Total income from traditional activities (Gross interest + TBC) 




Table 5  Traditional vs Non-traditional income, performance and risk  
[All banks in the sample] 
 
This table reports the results of a panel data regression fixed effect. Regression coefficients are reported with standard error in 
parenthesis. The dependent variables are ROA (1-3); SHROA (4-6) and Z-SCORE (7-9). No interaction effect (1, 4, 7). Size interaction 
effect (2, 5, 8). Leverage ratio interaction effect (3, 6, 9). NON_TOP measure the share of non-traditional income on total operating 
revenue. The following bank specific control are included in the regression: SIZE is the natural logarithm of Total Asset in thousands 
of euro, SIZE_SQ is the squared term of SIZE, COST_INCOME is the ratio between personnel and other administrative expenses over 
intermediation margin, E_TA is the ratio of equity to total asset, LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total asset, GROWTH is the 
growth rate of bank total asset, LTDB is the ratio between Loans and the sum of deposits and bonds, NPL is the ratio of total net 
non performing loans over total net loans, LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans,. Two macroeconomic controls are 
included as follows; GDP_INDEX is the annual growth rate of GDP weighted for branches and provinces and BREAK a dummy 
variable equals to zero for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 and equals to one otherwise (2009, 2010 and 2011). For a definition of 
the variables, see Table 1. The observation period is 1996–2011. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA SHROA SHROA SHROA Z-SCORE Z-SCORE Z-SCORE 
          
Constant -0.118 -0.120 -0.033 3.619 11.833 2.032 -84.890** -83.693** -218.992*** 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.088) (15.110) (15.515) (15.395) (38.560) (37.894) (28.992) 
NON_TOP 0.026*** 0.158*** 0.014* 2.298*** -11.427* 2.561*** 3.017 -66.781*** 22.287*** 
 (0.007) (0.051) (0.008) (0.826) (6.644) (0.951) (2.998) (22.797) (2.495) 
NON_TOP x SIZE  -0.01***   0.922**   4.733***  
  (0.003)   (0.443)   (1.533)  
NON_TOP x E_TA   0.145***   -3.209   -230.161*** 
   (0.046)   (5.728)   (15.201) 
SIZE 0.020* 0.019* 0.012 1.790 0.978 1.941 14.318*** 14.964*** 27.603*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (1.842) (1.871) (1.865) (4.899) (4.819) (3.615) 
SIZE_SQ -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.111* -0.093 -0.115** -0.517*** -0.563*** -0.848*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.162) (0.160) (0.118) 
COST_INCOME -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.012*** -1.677*** -1.786*** -1.686*** -0.741 -1.258 -1.393** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.231) (0.235) (0.232) (0.858) (0.859) (0.616) 
E_TA 0.037* 0.032 -0.044 2.242 2.602 4.027 136.140*** 138.708*** 264.437*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.033) (2.616) (2.603) (4.125) (9.698) (9.567) (10.955) 
LOAN -0.02*** -0.014** -0.013** -0.926 -1.091 -1.015 7.462*** 5.676** 0.655 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.762) (0.761) (0.779) (2.669) (2.686) (1.963) 
GROWTH -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.596* 0.641** 0.587* -0.703 -0.756 -1.452* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.324) (0.322) (0.325) (1.155) (1.135) (0.828) 
LTDB 0.009*** 0.007** 0.007** -0.098 -0.012 -0.066 -5.801*** -4.934*** -3.267*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.393) (0.393) (0.398) (1.401) (1.406) (1.017) 
NPL -0.020 -0.016 -0.024 -14.168** -13.892** -14.055** -46.596** -48.475** -39.820** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (5.981) (5.941) (5.993) (21.964) (21.593) (15.731) 
LLP 0.563*** 0.568*** 0.556*** 66.769*** 65.842*** 66.920*** 24.015 21.373 35.562 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (10.420) (10.358) (10.439) (38.689) (38.028) (27.709) 
GDP_INDEX -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.066 -0.049 -0.067 -0.004 0.070 -0.072 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.195) (0.194) (0.140) 
BREAK -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.326*** -0.317** -0.329*** -0.890* -0.866* -1.091*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.123) (0.122) (0.123) (0.457) (0.449) (0.328) 
          
Observations 308 308 308 306 306 306 308 308 308 
R-squared 0.517 0.531 0.536 0.625 0.632 0.626 0.670 0.683 0.831 
Adj. R-squared 0.383 0.397 0.404 0.520 0.526 0.518 0.578 0.592 0.784 
F-statistic 21.44*** 20.78*** 21.27*** 33.10*** 31.31*** 30.49*** 40.58*** 39.53*** 90.72*** 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table 6  Diversification between business lines, performance and risk 
[All banks in the sample] 
 
This table reports the results of a panel data regression fixed effect. Regression coefficients are reported with standard error in 
parenthesis. The dependent variables are ROA (1-3); SHROA (4-6) and Z-SCORE (7-9). No interaction effect (1, 4, 7). Size interaction 
effect (2, 5, 8). Leverage ratio interaction effect (3, 6, 9). MKT_TOP, AM_TOP, DIS_TOP and OPFIN_TOP measure respectively, the 
share of market and trading commission, asset management commission, commission and fee from the distribution of third party 
product and net results from financial operations in total non-traditional revenues. The following bank specific control are included 
in the regression: SIZE is the natural logarithm of Total Asset in thousands of euro, SIZE_SQ is the squared term of SIZE, 
COST_INCOME is the ratio between personnel and other administrative expenses over intermediation margin, E_TA is the ratio of 
equity to total asset, LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total asset, GROWTH is the growth rate of bank total asset, LTDB is the ratio 
between Loans and the sum of deposits and bonds, NPL is the ratio of total net non-performing loans over total net loans, LLP is the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans,. Two macroeconomic controls are included as follows; GDP_INDEX is the annual growth 
rate of GDP weighted for branches and provinces and BREAK a dummy variable equals to zero for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 
and equals to one otherwise (2009, 2010 and 2011). For a definition of the variables, see Table 1. The observation period is 1996–
2011. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA SHROA SHROA SHROA Z-SCORE Z-SCORE Z-SCORE 
          
Constant -0.186** -0.29*** -0.204** 4.959 3.235 1.095 -86.977** -51.637 -233.7*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.081) (15.515) (16.215) (15.782) (40.152) (41.638) (30.127) 
MKT_TOP 0.013 0.362*** 0.006 2.296* -3.331 2.333 3.141 -107.76*** 22.528*** 
 (0.009) (0.082) (0.012) (1.205) (11.575) (1.659) (4.419) (40.054) (4.355) 
AM_TOP 0.021** -0.039 -0.014 3.383** -34.68*** 4.048** -1.739 -149.77*** 12.005** 
 (0.010) (0.075) (0.013) (1.349) (10.035) (1.873) (4.991) (36.687) (4.930) 
DIS_TOP 0.052*** 0.377*** -0.09*** 3.172** -3.219 -5.694* 1.210 -163.99*** 11.037 
 (0.011) (0.116) (0.024) (1.464) (15.680) (3.336) (5.412) (56.905) (8.824) 
OPFIN_TOP 0.033*** 0.157*** 0.035*** 1.784* -0.030 1.197 5.043 -13.139 30.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.060) (0.011) (0.985) (8.680) (1.549) (3.508) (29.201) (4.003) 
MKT_TOP x SIZE  -0.03***   0.335   7.611***  
  (0.006)   (0.805)   (2.802)  
AM_TOP x SIZE  0.005   2.603***   10.006***  
  (0.005)   (0.677)   (2.478)  
DIS_TOP x SIZE  -0.02***   0.321   11.511***  
  (0.009)   (1.147)   (4.165)  
OPFIN_TOP x SIZE  -0.009**   0.098   1.264  
  (0.004)   (0.576)   (1.962)  
MKT_TOP x E_TA   0.057   -2.027   -277.9*** 
   (0.069)   (9.666)   (25.580) 
AM_TOP x E_TA   0.298***   -8.408   -163.3*** 
   (0.080)   (11.325)   (29.790) 
DIS_TOP x E_TA   1.017***   57.578***   -152.2*** 
   (0.147)   (20.726)   (54.869) 
OPFIN_TOP x E_TA   -0.057   3.656   -312.6*** 
   (0.098)   (13.876)   (36.650) 
SIZE 0.027** 0.040*** 0.033*** 1.570 1.853 2.132 14.733*** 10.538** 29.664*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (1.888) (1.967) (1.913) (5.025) (5.267) (3.726) 
SIZE_SQ -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.103* -0.115* -0.122** -0.534*** -0.420** -0.919*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.165) (0.173) (0.121) 
COST_INCOME -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -1.644*** -1.669*** -1.591*** -0.863 -1.217 -1.648*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.871) (0.858) (0.623) 
E_TA 0.046** 0.042** -0.026 1.967 3.680 3.122 138.010*** 145.899*** 268.92*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.030) (2.680) (2.698) (4.200) (9.898) (9.879) (11.103) 
LOAN -0.012** -0.007 -0.014** -0.917 -0.761 -1.557* 8.072*** 8.192*** -0.268 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.782) (0.773) (0.876) (2.747) (2.777) (2.235) 
GROWTH -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.611* 0.454 0.636* -0.666 -1.399 -1.050 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.326) (0.330) (0.325) (1.158) (1.145) (0.829) 
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LTDB 0.010*** 0.007** 0.008* -0.054 -0.002 0.082 -6.171*** -5.423*** -2.147 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.418) (0.410) (0.594) (1.507) (1.481) (1.548) 
NPL -0.023 -0.023 -0.048 -13.602** -13.668** -15.131** -47.889** -46.155** -42.23*** 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.042) (6.035) (5.893) (5.987) (22.059) (21.334) (15.631) 
LLP 0.585*** 0.630*** 0.665*** 65.053*** 66.246*** 72.504*** 30.600 17.544 45.185 
 (0.082) (0.078) (0.076) (10.618) (10.477) (10.748) (39.245) (38.325) (28.396) 
GDP_INDEX -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.068 -0.078 -0.073 0.009 0.076 -0.065 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.196) (0.194) (0.138) 
BREAK -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.345*** -0.290** -0.249* -0.835* -1.047** -0.874** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.126) (0.128) (0.131) (0.468) (0.470) (0.345) 
          
Hypotheses testing
a
          
β1-β2=0 0.54 19.13*** 1.21 0.58 6.07** 0.46 0.87 0.88 2.55 
β1-β3=0 10.93*** 0.01 14.05*** 2.96** 0.00 5.36** 0.26 0.76 1.57 
β1-β4=0 4.76** 4.85** 4.18** 0.19 0.07 0.33 0.20 4.35** 2.05 
β2-β3=0 25.46*** 12.83*** 9.94*** 0.07 4.05** 8.88*** 0.99 0.06 0.01 
β2-β4=0 0.95 4.48** 6.93*** 1.05 7.32*** 1.17 1.43 9.03*** 6.97*** 
β3-β4=0 2.55* 3.53* 25.35*** 0.74 0.04 4.12** 0.42 6.92*** 4.49** 
          
Observations 308 308 308 306 306 306 308 308 308 
R-squared 0.576 0.629 0.659 0.627 0.651 0.643 0.673 0.701 0.840 
Adj. R-squared 0.451 0.511 0.551 0.516 0.539 0.528 0.576 0.606 0.790 
F-statistic 21.49*** 20.80*** 23.70*** 26.33*** 22.69*** 21.87*** 32.48*** 28.71*** 64.54*** 
 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
a




Table 6  Robustness check Different performance measures 
 
This table reports the results of a panel data regression fixed effect. Regression coefficients are reported with standard error in 
parenthesis. The dependent variables are ROE (1-2); SHROE (3-4). NON_TOP measure the share of non-traditional income on total 
operating revenue. The following bank specific control are included in the regression: SIZE is the natural logarithm of Total Asset in 
thousands of euro, SIZE_SQ is the squared term of SIZE, COST_INCOME is the ratio between personnel and other administrative 
expenses over intermediation margin, E_TA is the ratio of equity to total asset, LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total asset, 
GROWTH is the growth rate of bank total asset, LTDB is the ratio between Loans and the sum of deposits and bonds, NPL is the 
ratio of total net non performing loans over total net loans, LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans,. Two 
macroeconomic controls are included as follows; GDP_INDEX is the annual growth rate of GDP weighted for branches and 
provinces and BREAK a dummy variable equals to zero for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 and equals to one otherwise (2009, 2010 
and 2011). For a definition of the variables, see Table 1. The observation period is 1996–2011. 
 
     
VARIABLES ROE ROE SHROE SHROE 
     
Constant -1.664 -1.735 15.432 15.711 
 (1.152) (1.202) (18.052) (18.501) 
NON_TOP 0.150*  1.811*  
 (0.090)  (0.987)  
MKT_TOP  0.074  2.827* 
  (0.132)  (1.437) 
AM_TOP  0.204*  2.928* 
  (0.149)  (1.609) 
DIS_TOP  0.235*  2.692* 
  (0.162)  (1.745) 
OPFIN_TOP  0.148*  1.027 
  (0.105)  (1.174) 
SIZE 0.261* 0.265* -0.271 -0.383 
 (0.146) (0.150) (2.201) (2.251) 
SIZE_SQ -0.009* -0.009* -0.030 -0.024 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.068) (0.070) 
COST_INCOME -0.191*** -0.189*** -1.453*** -1.408*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.276) (0.280) 
E_TA -0.095 -0.116 -4.938 -4.887 
 (0.290) (0.296) (3.125) (3.196) 
LOAN -0.004 -0.003 -1.029 -0.964 
 (0.080) (0.082) (0.910) (0.932) 
GROWTH 0.062* 0.063* 0.588 0.595 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.387) (0.388) 
LTDB 0.074* 0.088* 0.434 0.332 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.470) (0.499) 
NPL -0.429 -0.430 -10.080 -9.214 
 (0.656) (0.661) (7.146) (7.196) 
LLP 4.787*** 4.788*** 49.297*** 46.568*** 
 (1.156) (1.175) (12.449) (12.661) 
GDP_INDEX 0.005 0.005 0.024 0.020 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.063) (0.063) 
BREAK -0.027** -0.027* -0.493*** -0.529*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.147) (0.150) 
     
Observations 308 308 306 306 
R-squared 0.386 0.389 0.470 0.474 
Adj. R-squared 0.215 0.209 0.321 0.318 
F-statistic 12.60 10.07 17.59 14.14 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table 7  Robustness check Endogeneity and selectivity Issues 
 
The table shows regression results for the regression of banks’ performance on a set of explanatory variables, including a proxy for 
the degree of diversification as robustness tests of our results in Table 5 (Columns 1-4-7). The estimation technique is Heckman 
(1979) treatment effects model by maximum likelihood. The first row denotes the dependent variable. DIVERSIFIED is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether a firm is diversified or not. The dummy equals one, if the ratio of non traditional income over total 
operating income exceeds 22.61%, i.e. the 75% quantile of the empirical distribution. The following bank specific control are 
included in the regression: SIZE is the natural logarithm of Total Asset in thousands of euro, SIZE_SQ is the squared term of SIZE, 
COST_INCOME is the ratio between personnel and other administrative expenses over intermediation margin, E_TA is the ratio of 
equity to total asset, LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total asset, GROWTH is the growth rate of bank total asset, LTDB is the ratio 
between Loans and the sum of deposits and bonds, NPL is the ratio of total net non performing loans over total net loans, LLP is the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans. One macroeconomic control is included: BREAK a dummy variable equals to zero for the 
years 2006, 2007 and 2008 and equals to one otherwise (2009, 2010 and 2011). For a definition of the variables, see Table 1. The 
observation period is 1996–2011.  
 
    
VARIABLES ROA SHROA Z-Score 
    
Constant -0.012 -7.985** -57.159** 
 (0.020) (3.785) (29.119) 
DIVERSIFIED 0.002 0.973** -10.749** 
 (0.002) (0.416) (5.432) 
SIZE 0.005* 1.399*** 7.436** 
 (0.002) (0.461) (3.518) 
SIZE_SQ -0.000** -0.042*** -0.186* 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.107) 
COST_INCOME -0.019*** -2.526*** -3.690 
 (0.002) (0.291) (2.381) 
E_TA 0.055*** 4.744*** 107.662*** 
 (0.008) (1.376) (11.422) 
LOAN -0.004 1.108** 18.681*** 
 (0.003) (0.457) (3.857) 
LTDB 0.001 -0.672 -7.530** 
 (0.003) (0.427) (3.671) 
NPL -0.056* -8.639 75.618 
 (0.034) (6.016) (48.952) 
LLP 0.469*** 84.660*** 404.139*** 
 (0.064) (11.405) (93.138) 
BREAK -0.002*** -0.588*** -0.896 
 (0.001) (0.135) (1.116) 
Simultaneous probit estimation (diversified as dependant) 
Constant -0.590*** -0.608*** -0.596*** 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.088) 
GROWTH -1.277** -0.970* -1.240** 
 (0.615) (0.569) (0.617) 
GDP_INDEX -0.386 -0.412* -0.341 
 (0.253) (0.243) (0.244) 
    
LR-test of independent equations 0.07 2.97 0.35 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
